Abstract-Safety analysis is a key activity for the development of railway transportation systems. The analysis is used not only to determine whether new systems do not expose the general public to unduly high levels of risks, but also to inform the development process itself through identification and allocation of appropriate 
INTRODUCTION
Safety engineering practices of railway systems domain are codified in a number of mature standards [8] [9] [10] . However, these documents focus on the construction of the 'primary' safety case concerned with demonstration of system safety and collection of appropriate evidence; little requirements and guidance provided for the development of 'secondary' safety case that is concerned with the trustworthiness of the analyses and evidence. For example, section 5.3.9 of [10] , "Safety Verification and Validation", is concerned with validation of the system design with respect to safety requirements rather than validation of the safety analyses and underlying models with respect to the reality and actual behavior of systems in operation. Similarly, description of the Safety and RAMS Lifecycles (in [10] and [8] respectively) is concerned with relating safety activities (e.g. analysis techniques) to the stages of the system lifecycle; the documents provide no coverage of the lifecycle of safety analysis artifacts and their evaluation.
Reliance of inaccurate or inadequate analysis, models and, ultimately, safety evidence can clearly undermine the validity of the system safety case as a whole. Selection of the adequate analysis techniques -for instance based on the guidance of Annex A of EN50128 or Annex E of EN50129 -does not in itself guarantee accuracy and adequacy of the analysis being performed for the specific system. Furthermore, the rapid adaptation of new technologies (most notably -software and wireless communications networks) and increasing complexity of modem rail transportation systems mean that safety analysis techniques are increasingly applied outside of their originally intended scope and in contexts for which little prior experience exists.
At the same time, modem railway control systems are designed to achieve increasing levels of automation with a decreasing (if any) opportunity for effective human operator intervention. In other words, the criticality of railways systems and importance of the safety analysis increases at the same time as novel, less tested, safety analysis techniques are being adopted or classical techniques are applied to technologies for which they were not originally developed. In this context it is essential for safety analysis models and results to be validated and for the adequacy of the analysis to be justified within the railway systems safety cases. This paper proposes an approach for validation of the safety analysis and, more widely, discusses implications of analysis uncertainty on safety management practices. For clarity of exposition the discussion is related to the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [21] that most readers would be familiar with. However, the principles outlined in the paper are not specific to the FT A and will hold for many classical analysis techniques as well as novel Model-Based Safety Assessment (MBSA) approaches [14] . The following section presents a brief overview of the FT A and restates the case for Fault Tree validation. Sections 3 and 4 outline the technical proposal based on the notions of Failure Injection and Lightweight Refinement respectively. Section 5 discusses the wider problem of inherent epistemic uncertainty of safety analysis and the importance of proactive management of assumptions.
II. ADEQUACY OF SAFETY ANALYSIS
Arguably the most widely used safety analysis method, FT A [20, 21] is a deductive technique that facilitates a structured and systematic review of system design to establish potential causes of the hazards. In the railway domain FTA can be applied in its 'classical' form or as part of a Cause Consequence Diagram construction. Broadly speaking, FT A consists of two phases: construction of the Fault Tree (FT) and its evaluation. The latter phase comprises qualitative analysis, that establishes Minimal Cut Sets contained in the tree, and quantitative evaluation that is primarily concerned with estimation of the likelihood of the so called Top Level Event typically representing a system-level hazard.
When used, FT A plays a pivotal role in the system development process. Firstly, it is used to assess safety (and feasibility) of system design proposals. Secondly, it is often used to drive design decisions by assisting in the identification of derived safety requirements for sub-systems, key equipment and components. Finally, FT A can contribute to prioritization of development effort arising from safety considerations and, in its earliest iterations, informs allocation of Safety Integrity Levels.
However, a FT is essentially a model of the system -"an abstraction defmed with an intended goal in mind" [18] . An incorrect or inadequate model, clearly, can undermine analysis conducted on its basis and result in suboptimal or even erroneous design decisions. There exists a number of sources of potential fault tree inadequacies ranging from more trivial errors (e.g. 'typos') to inaccuracies (or excessive uncertainties) of elementary reliability data (e.g. failure rates) and, most importantly, to incomplete understanding of the design and causality of failure modes. It is therefore reasonable to ask why such models are trusted by the safety engineers and regulators?
A. Validation of Fault Trees
The processes of evaluating and establishing adequacy of the models used for predictive analysis is called model validation. However, rigorous validation of FTs is rarely performed and the process of ensuring that these models adequately reflect reality remains informal. Furthermore, the original NUREG Fault Tree Analysis Handbook [21] provides no guidance on fault tree V & V and a more recent revision of the handbook published by NASA [20] contains only a one page-long discussion on a checklist-driven review of the trees. Whilst a review process may provide some degree of confidence in adequacy of the FT, this evidence could be disproportionately weak given the importance of the FT A in the development process. Furthermore, whilst the review process may credibly identify incorrect behavior (such as an incorrect logical gate) of the model, it is unlikely to be efficient for checking that a tree is complete, especially, if incompleteness is caused by inadequate modeling assumptions and/or imperfect understanding of the system design.
Overall, it can be concluded that FTs are to a large extent 'trusted by construction' [15] . Indeed, fault tree handbooks [20, 21] contain a number of construction rules and principles (such as "primary, secondary command" and "immediate, necessary and sufficient" principles) that essentially provide safety engineers with elaborate check-lists and facilitate completeness of the system assessment and, thus, of the FT. Further guidance is provided in a large number of reliability and safety engineering textbooks and FT A method is often covered in university engineering courses.
On the other hand, however, the trustworthiness and effectiveness of even the 'classical' FTA has been previously criticized [11, 16] . Furthermore, the combinatorial nature of FT A is often perceived as too limiting for modem software intensive and highly reconfigurable systems. Whilst dynamic extensions to the 'classical' FTA (e.g. [7] ) as well as novel model-based safety analysis methods and languages (e.g. [3, 4, 19] ) have been developed to overcome this limitation, these techniques are currently neither supplemented by extensive modeling guidance nor supported by a long history of industrial application [15] . Consequently, when used in the context of modem railway systems, FT A has to be either applied to technologies for which it was not originally intended or the methodology has to be significantly adapted. Either approach clearly results in a significant decrease in reasonable 'confidence by construction process'.
B. F M ECA as an FTA Validation Technique
FT A is not the only technique strongly advocated by the railways safety standards and is typically supplemented by Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA). Unlike FT A, FMECA is an inductive technique that proceeds from a component malfunction to identify its effect at the levels of component, sub-system and system interfaces. Because of the opposite 'direction' to FTA and application at the later stages of the development, FMECA is sometimes perceived as fulfilling the safety analysis validation task. Upon closer examination, however, it is easy to see that such a position cannot be fully justified:
Firstly, FMECA is inherently biased towards considering effects of single failures with investigation of co-effectors being performed in an informal fashion.
Secondly, in contrast to FTA, FMECA does not result in construction of any structured model of the causal dependencies between failure modes of system components. Thirdly, the relationship can only be established between multiple FMECA tables and multiple FTs. Furthermore, no general approaches to establishing such traceability currently exist.
Nevertheless, FMECA may have a partial validation role in two respects. Firstly, it provides an effective means of reviewing (and validating) probabilistic data associated with FT's basic events. Secondly, and most importantly to the subject matter of this paper, it can be used to establish whether single points of failure haven't been erroneously overlooked by the FT A. The later can be seen as essentially a partial validation of the FT albeit in practice mostly limited to the 'depth' of one basic event. These observations about the potential V & V role of FMECA and its limitations motivate the approach presented in the following sections.
III. F AlLURE INJECTION
The preceding section has discussed the importance of the validation of safety analyses such as FT A. In general, model validation is concerned with establishing that a model of the system provides an adequate description of the reality. However, for safety analysis models (e.g. FTs) the direct link to reality is notoriously difficult to establish. The Model Driven Engineering (MDE) paradigm helps to partially overcome this problem. As systems are designed on the basis of models and with an increasing degree of automation (e.g. automated code generation) safety analyses may be validated with respect to such design models. Furthermore, the concept of Failure Injection provides a means of linking the 'worlds' of safety analysis and system design whilst also overcoming some of the limitations of the FMECA mentioned above.
Failure Injection (FI) is one of the prominent families of Model-Based Safety Analysis techniques [14] that has been developed and extensively evaluated in the aerospace domain (e.g. by ESACS [6] and ISAAC [2] projects). Under the FI approach safety engineers receive design models of the system, specified in languages such as SCADE or Matlab Simulink, from the development process. The model is then extended with Failure Mode (FM) models -simple model components 'injected' into the flows of original model. Each FM component (see Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 ) typically has two inputs and an output. One of the inputs and the output are used to insert the FM into a flow; their types are therefore the same as the type of the original flow. The remaining input is Boolean and is called 'activation' of the FM. The component itself defines the effect of the Failure Mode -such as value being stuck at zero (Fig. 1) or an inversion of a Boolean value (Fig. 2) . When activation input is set to true this deviation is applied to the flow, whereas inactive FM components simply propagate original inputs to outputs, thus, having no effect on the behavior.
The ESACS and ISAAC projects developed a comprehensive library of failure modes and adapted modeling environments such as SCADE [1] to provide graphical user interface based support the model extension process and defmition of bespoke failure modes. The platform also 'hides' implementation of the failure modes (i.e. FM components) from the user, thus, avoiding excessive cluttering of the model and ensuring that, even when extended, the model can still be used in the development process. Finally, tools were also developed to enable analysis of the extended system models with respect to system-level hazards specified over model variables [1, 5, 6, 17] . Whilst often based on model checking technology, the analysis performed by these tools is logically equivalent to an exhaustive search through activation of all possible permutations of failure modes. Permutations that lead to the satisfaction of the failure condition expression are reported as Minimal Cut Sets (MCSs). It is important to stress that such analysis requires adaptation of typical model checkers to ensure that the model analysis does not stop after a single counter example is encountered. Overall, FI can be seen as a semi-automated approach to multi-event FMEAlFMECA that, by construction, guarantees consistency between analysis results and system design models. Analysis results can be presented as MCSs establishing a common conceptual format with FT A as well as other MBSA techniques [14] .
A. Limitations o/the FI Approach
The guarantee of consistency between analysis results and design models may suggest that Failure Injection can be used as the primary means for the system safety analysis replacing, rather than complementing, FTA. We do not subscribe to such a view for a number of reasons.
Firstly, by construction, FI-based safety analysis requires existence of detailed and executable models of the system. As such models are only available at the later stages of the development, FI analysis cannot be used for effectively informing the new system architecture design and gradual derivation and allocation of requirements.
Secondly, this approach to safety analysis can only consider dependencies between components that are identified in the design model. These are typically limited to intentional influences over intentional connections between components. However, in the presence of failures new and unintentional connections can sometimes be formed and components may influence each-other in an unexpected fashion (cf. Appendix B of EN50l29 [10] ). Examples of such unintentional interactions include short-circuit propagation in electrical systems or inadvertent locking of the writing process by a reader under synchronous communications protocols in software and electronic systems. In general, unquestioned use of system design models may impose undue constraints on the depth and breadth of safety assessment, leading to incomplete analysis results with respect to the real-world behavior of the system. Finally, basing safety assessment and design processes on the same system models would introduce risks of single points of failure into the overall development process. It would also undermine the independence principles behind safety organization structures suggested by EN50l29. Saying this, the ability to demonstrate consistency between FT A and FI would clearly increase confidence in the adequacy of the safety analysis.
IV. LIGHTWEIGHT REFINEMENT
Whilst safety analysis based on Failure Injection, in our view, provides an opportunity for (partial) validation of Fault Tree Analysis conducted throughout design of the railway systems, it is not a validation approach per se. To achieve FTA validation it is necessary to establish a formal link between FI results and fault trees.
As was mentioned earlier, Minimal Cut Sets (MCSs) provide a common conceptual format between a number of techniques. However, given two sets of MCSs obtained for the same hazard from FTA and FI-based analysis, how can we reach a conclusion on whether a FT was adequate?
A. Na'tve relation Informally, we should expect FTA to yield 'worse' results than FI. Firstly, we expect this because of the pessimistic nature of the FTA. Secondly, as was discussed above, FI-based analysis is limited to a subset of dependencies between the system components and should therefore uncover only a subset of hazardous failure scenarios (i.e. MCSs). In this context worse means that MCSs obtained from FTA may: The reverse, however, may not hold: for every MCS uncovered by FI there must exist at least one FTA's MCS such that the later is equal to-or is contained within-the former. This forms the basis for our lightweight refmement relation:
Where, RF! and RFTA are sets of MCSs obtained from FI and FTA respectively and, similarly, M F! and MFTA are individual cut sets in these two sets (respectively).
B. M ore Realistic Relation
Whilst the above formula provides the core of our relation, it does so in an unrealistic setting -FI's and FTA's MCSs are assumed to be defmed over identical vocabulary of faults. In practice it is unlikely that the two independently conducted analyses will use identical identifiers for failures (basic events). Furthermore, as different analyses may be performed at different levels of system decomposition, from different viewpoints and may rely on different forms of abstraction, the basic events of FI may not uniquely map to basic events of FTA (and vice versa). This means that the lightweight refinement relation needs to be generalized to the situation when RF! and RFTA are defmed over two different vocabularies of basic events (VF! and VFTA respectively) with such vocabularies being related by a potentially many-to-many mapping (called "dictionary" and denoted by D). 
In the above iFl and IFTA are basic events found in two sets of results and the remaining terms are as previously defmed. The refmement relation can now be trivially redefmed as:
More detailed explanation of the lightweight refmement relation is outside the scope of this paper and can be found in [12, 13] . To conclude this section we observe that the tools that support refinement check and definition of the dictionary have been developed in MISSA (More Integrated Systems Safety Assessment) project 1 and evaluated in the context of the incremental assessment of aircraft systems. We believe that application in the railway domain and in the context of validation of FTs presents no new technical challenges.
v.
SAFETY MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS
Whilst FT A validation, such as that based on failure injection and demonstration of the lightweight refinement between results, provides increased confidence in the correctness and adequacy of the safety analysis results, it is important to stress that validation can never be complete in the formal sense. Safety analyses are inherently predictive and the models capture a safety engineer's hypotheses about system behavior in presence of failure. However, whilst the epistemic uncertainty inherent in the safety analysis cannot be removed it should be actively managed throughout the development process. 'One off demonstration of consistency between multiple independently defmed models, that underlies the approach presented above, is one tool among many that should be used to support this process.
Specifically, we believe that safety engineers should systematically track all assumptions being made during FT A. Each recorded assumption should result in requirements for further analysis, testing, justification or even operational monitoring. An "assumptions log" document should form a core of the uncertainty management process just like hazard log forms the core of the 'primary' safety assessment process; it should remain a 'live' document throughout the system lifecycle. In particular, an assumptions log should be maintained in the in-service phases of the lifecycle and its contents should inform the design of operators' monitoring programs and Safety Management Systems.
Whilst not explicitly called for in the curr ent railways safety standards, model adequacy evidence can be easily incorporated into the structure of the EN50129 compliant safety case [10] . In particular, procedures outlining the uncertainty management process should be included in the Safety Plan presented in Part 3 (Safety Management Report) whereas assumption logs and evidence of safety analysis validation can be presented in either Part 3 or Part 4 of the safety case. Where the process of establishing-and the evidence confIrming-the adequacy of the safety analysis are sufficiently complex an explicit adequacy argument should be included in Part 5 of the overall system safety case.
Furthermore, in accordance with the philosophy of EN50129, the degree of rigor of safety analysis validation and uncertainty management could be varied depending on the hazard severity and Safety Integrity Level (SIL) of the sub system concerned (i.e. using the severity and SIL as an indication of the degree of assurance required). For example, in terms of Failure Injection, it may be sufficient to inject failure modes only into the external interfaces of SIL 0 sub-systems, whereas -for higher SIL subsystems -injection should be performed at the lower, component, level. Similarly, in-service validation of safety analyses of lower SILs sub-systems may be predominantly based on periodic audits and incident investigation data whereas, for higher SILs and more severe hazards, carefully designed continuous data monitoring and abnormality detection programs are likely to be desirable.
Finally, it is important to note that whilst the EN50129 does not contain explicit requirements for safety analysis validation and systematic management of epistemic uncertainty, the requirements for the "safety life-cycle" ( §5.3.2) and "structured safety justifIcation" ( §5.3.1O) implicitly suggest that such processes may be necessary. However, in our view, the standard can be improved in the future by inclusion of explicit requirements and guidance in this regard.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Safety analysis forms an essential role in the development of modem railways systems. It plays a particularly critical role during the defmition of new control approaches, such as Computer Based Train Control (CBTC) and Full Authority Operation (F AO), and development of the associated reference system architectures. Whilst untrustworthy safety analyses can undermine the quality of design decisions and the safety of the railway systems, safety standards in the railway domain currently contain no explicit requirement for the validation of, and management of uncertainty in, safety analyses. This paper has described the need for the validation of the safety analysis and proposed a concrete technical approach based on the concept of failure injection and the lightweight refInement relation. Although the authors' research is predominantly concerned with the application of novel model based safety analysis methods, for clarity, discussions in the paper have been related to Fault Tree Analysis. Whilst the approach to validation is novel it builds upon some of the technical requirements of existing standards including requirements for software simulation under abnormal conditions (cf. §13.4.9 of EN50128) and requirements for demonstration the effects of single faults (cf. §5.4 of EN50129). Furthermore, FI can be seen as multi-event generalization of traditional FMEA/FMECA and its adaptation specifIcally for the validation role.
The paper has also argued that safety analysis validation must be embedded in a wider systematic uncertainty management process. This should be undertaken in parallel with the 'primary' safety activities currently described in EN50129. We have also argued that this position is consistent with the spirit of the regulation and resultant evidence can be naturally included in the EN50129 compliant safety case.
Finally, we believe that in the future uncertainty management and safety analysis validation process must be extended into operational stages of the lifecycle. Safety Management Systems should contain provisions for continuous data monitoring, occurrence investigation and periodic audits specifIcally focused on pro-active and early detection of errors and inaccuracies in safety analyses following their approval by the authorities. Design of such comprehensive monitoring programs and their relationship to Safety Management Systems within the railways domain, however, require signifIcant further research and fall outside the scope of this paper.
